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PrivHome: Privacy-Preserving Authenticated
Communication in Smart Home Environment
Geong Sen Poh, Prosanta Gope, Member, IEEE , and Jianting Ning
Abstract—A smart home enables users to access devices such as lighting, HVAC, temperature sensors, and surveillance camera. It
provides a more convenient and safe living environment for users. Security and privacy, however, is a key concern since information
collected from these devices are normally communicated to the user through an open network (i. e. Internet) or system provided by the
service provider. The service provider may store and have access to these information. Emerging smart home hubs such as Samsung
SmartThings and Google Home are also capable of collecting and storing these information. Leakage and unauthorized access to the
information can have serious consequences. For example, the mere timing of switching on/off of an HVAC unit may reveal the presence
or absence of the home owner. Similarly, leakage or tampering of critical medical information collected from wearable body sensors
can have serious consequences. Encrypting these information will address the issues, but it also reduces utility since queries is no
longer straightforward. Therefore, we propose a privacy-preserving scheme, PrivHome. It supports authentication, secure data storage
and query for smart home systems. PrivHome provides data confidentiality as well as entity and data authentication to prevent an
outsider from learning or modifying the data communicated between the devices, service provider, gateway, and the user. It further
provides privacy-preserving queries in such a way that the service provider, and the gateway does not learn content of the data. To the
best of our knowledge, privacy-preserving queries for smart home systems has not been considered before. Under our scheme is a
new, lightweight entity and key-exchange protocol, and an efficient searchable encryption protocol. Our scheme is practical as both
protocols are based solely on symmetric cryptographic techniques. We demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness of our scheme based
on experimental and simulation results, as well as comparisons to existing smart home security protocols.
Index Terms—Smart home privacy, encrypted query, searchable encryption.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
SMART home can be loosely defined as a home withconnected appliances with software controls. A user,
using software installed in computing devices (such as
mobile phone, tablet and laptop), is able to control and
automate these appliances. The controllable appliances can
be set to learn and change their behaviours accordingly and
these define how “smart” the appliances are [1]. Example of
such appliances are heaters, lights, cameras, doors, fridges,
TVs, washing machines, as well as sensors that detect light,
temperature, motion and humidity [2]. Furthermore, these
devices can be controlled through smart home hubs such
as Samsung SmartThings and Google Home using Wifi
connection provided by the home gateway (i.e. Wifi router).
A common application scenario is home video surveil-
lance. Cameras are installed in a home at strategic area. A
user then remotely monitors his or her home through video
streams and images transmitted from the cameras. Other
compelling reasons for the adoption of smart homes include
health monitoring, which is especially important with the
aging populations in many countries, entertainment, bet-
ter energy distributions and cost savings through smart
metering [4] and control of heating and air conditioning
(HVAC) [5], for example.
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1.1 A Smart Home Architecture
A typical setup of a smart home is shown in Figure 1. This is
an adoption of the smart home architecture presented in [3],
[6], [7]. In general, a smart home system consists of users of
the system, a gateway, a service provider and various smart
devices that are seamlessly connected through a computer
network. In more specific terms, a gateway can be a home
router providing wifi connections to all the smart devices,
which typically does not store information. The service
provider is provision under a TD-SCDMA network that
provides administrative and management functionalities,
and may store user information. The user communicates
with the service provider through a base station and the
Internet, while the service provider communicate with the
gateway via a secure channel. We have mentioned examples
of smart devices, this includes sensors such as temperature
sensor, as well as more capable devices such as smart hubs.
In a smart home setting, normally, a smart home ser-
vice provider hosts services and an individual subscribes
to the services. Alternatively, users may purchase the de-
vices separately, install, register and connect to the services
themselves. Once completed, a user can control the various
devices through a mobile device. If a smart hub is deployed,
then it serves as a smart device used to control many of the
other smart devices. The communication between the smart
devices and the user is thus via the smart hub.
1.2 Security and Privacy Issues in Smart Homes
All of the stated controls and activities involve collections
of data from the sensors and smart devices, which are
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Fig. 1. A Smart Home Architecture
communicated through an open network (i. e. Internet) to
the mobile devices via the service provider. These introduce
significant security and privacy concerns. As discussed by
Apthorpe et al. [8], sensitive information recorded by these
devices include sleeping patterns, medical information,
exercise routines, child behaviours and sexual activities. In
fact, the surveys performed by Choe et al. [9] has shown
that users are generally concerned about sensitive privacy
information being recorded by the smart home devices.
Data-in-Transit. Since data are collected and shared through
the Internet, unauthorized parties might attempt to access
and learn the content of the data. A common solution is to
deploy standard cryptographic protocols such as TLS/SSL
to authenticate and secure data transmission. Nevertheless,
these protocols may still be too computationally expensive
for deployment in resource-constrained smart devices, as
was discussed by Kumar et al. [6]. Due to this, in this
work we propose a lightweight entity authentication and
key establishment protocol to address security for data-in-
transit, using only symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Data-at-rest. In a smart home system, data collected
from a device may be stored in the device itself and/or in
the cloud storage. For example, smart hub likes Amazon
Echo and Google Home store voice clips in their cloud
storage [10]. This raises concern on privacy of the stored
data. As was discussed by Fernandes et al. [11], flaws
were found on one of the smart hub cloud platform, which
resulted in an attacker being able to access the underlying
data and issue commands to different devices. Also, the
service provider becomes high value target for adversary
and can potentially be compromised. This means we should
not assume the service provider to be fully trusted, in
contrast to existing proposals, for example, in [7]. Instead,
we assume the service provider to be semi-trusted. A
mitigation approach is to encrypt all the data stored in the
smart devices and at the service provider. However, using
conventional encryption to encrypt data makes it difficult
for a smart device (or the smart hub) to process the data
and for the user to query them. Solution to this is to allow
for privacy-preserving queries on encrypted data, which
we proposed.
Host (sensors & smart devices). Finally, the sensors and
smart devices must be secured as well. As was discussed by
Choi et al., during an event discovered by Proofpoint [12],
more than 750,000 consumer devices were compromised
and used to disseminate phishing and SPAM emails. Our
entity authentication and key establishment protocol allows
the user and the smart devices to communicate through
a challenge-response secure session, instead of through a
simple username password logins.
In summary, we envisage an active adversary who is
an outsider that may attempt to study and modify the
communication between the user, the service provider and
the gateway. We also consider a semi-honest adversary (e.g.
service provider, or the gateway) who study the commu-
nication between the user and the gateway (or the service
provider) in order to learn information from the collected
data.
1.3 Our Contributions
Smart home solutions typically protect data privacy through
access control mechanism. If the mechanism is compro-
mised, plain data can be accessed by an attacker. Further-
more, from a privacy standpoint, we would not want the
service provider to learn our daily behaviour and activities.
We thus envisage a stronger security guarantee in smart
home system through data encryption, which means even
when the access control mechanism is compromised, an
attacker will not be able to make sense of the data he
extracted successfully. Nevertheless, a user (or a gateway
or the service provider) may still need to retrieve informa-
tion or submit command to the smart devices. In order to
perform these tasks even when the data is encrypted, we
propose a mechanism for queries on encrypted data. We in-
troduce an efficient scheme, PrivHome, that supports entity
and data authentication, as well as secure data storage and
privacy-preserving queries in a smart home environment.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any work
on privacy-preserving queries for smart home. Underlying
our scheme is a new entity and key establishment protocol
and an interactive searchable encryption protocol that we
designed, combination of which resulted in our PrivHome
scheme that fulfills the stated security goals. We note that
the combination of the two protocols requires integrating
query on encrypted data into the authentication and key
establishment protocol efficiently. It also requires a defini-
tion on the security requirements and the combination to be
performed in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. On
the former, we show that, both asymptotically and through
experimentation, our scheme is at least on par with the
existing schemes in term of computation and bandwidth ef-
ficiency, yet provides both entity authentication and private
query. On the latter, we achieve security as per our model
through the derivation of authentication and searchable
encryption keys from a key established between the entities,
and further analyze security of the scheme based on the
definition of the two protocols.
2 RELATED WORKS
The two main area of study related to our work are the
existing proposals on solving the security and privacy issues
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in smart homes, and the techniques for queries on encrypted
data. In the following we review state-of-the-art proposals
in these two area.
2.1 Security and Privacy in Smart Homes
Komninos et al. [13] surveyed the security and privacy
issues on smart home environment, focusing on the smart
grid application. Nevertheless, Some of the security is-
sues and countermeasures discussed can be applied on a
general smart home environment. They categorized secu-
rity objectives (e.g. confidentiality, authenticity, availabil-
ity, non-repudiation) and listed potential countermeasures,
such as using cryptographic techniques for confidentiality,
and anonymization techniques for data privacy. Kumar et
al. [6] proposed a lightweight session key-establishment
and authentication scheme for smart home environment.
With secure key establishment, the scheme provides data
confidentiality during message transmission, mutual entity
authentication and data integrity protection. The scheme is
lightweight since it is designed using only symmetric cryp-
tographic primitives. Song et al. [14] also proposed a secure
protocol that achieves similar goals. Their main idea is for a
server (i.e. the service provider) to generate secret keys for
the devices based on chaotic map techniques. Then message
authentication code based on the generated secret keys is
deployed for encryption, entity and data authentication. In
2017, Kumar et al. [15] further proposed a key-establishment
and authentication scheme that also supports anonymity of
the smart devices, in order to prevent an outsider from
learning the types of devices in a smart home. Indepen-
dently, Wazid et al. [16] proposed an efficient secure authen-
tication scheme specifically caters for resource-constrained
devices. The underpinning idea is to first register the user
and the smart devices through a registration authority. Sub-
sequently authentication is performed based on the secret
keys created during the registration phase. Efficiency is
achieved through using only symmetric key primitives. In
all these schemes, both the service provider and the gateway
are assumed fully trusted. In contrast, our work focuses
on semi-honest service provider and gateway. Chakravorty
et al. [17] discussed in general a secure data collection
framework that consists of an access control mechanism for
authorization, as well as method for de-identification and
re-identification of sensitive fields in a smart home record.
They suggested the use of message authentication code for
de-identification and an identifier map for re-identification,
as well as k-anonymity technique in generalization of the
information. Their focus is to provide for privacy-preserving
data analytics and safeguard data privacy through access
control. Lee et al. [18] proposed similar solution based on
cryptographic hash function and access control but consider
a smart community with hierarchical access instead. In
contrast, we focus on providing data privacy, yet at the same
time allowing the data to be queried in a privacy-preserving
manner using cryptographic techniques.
Choi et al. [19] discussed attack on firmware of the smart
devices, whereby an attacker is able to cause malfunctions
on the smart devices through exploitation on the firmware.
They propose a scheme for verifiable and validated update
on firmware as a way to mitigate this issue. With such a
scheme, a firmware can be quickly updated, therefore re-
ducing the window of attack. Underlying their scheme is the
combination of pairing-based computation, Schnorr’s signa-
ture scheme and symmetric-based hash chain. Apthorpe et
al. [8], [20], [21] demonstrated that information collected and
transmitted through the Internet from the smart devices can
be inferred by the Internet service provider or observers of
the network.Their attack utilises traffic metadata. It involves
first learning the device type through device fingerprint, and
then infer user information through traffic rates. As stated,
knowing the device type (e.g. a pacemaker) in itself is con-
sidered a privacy leakage. They suggest using the combina-
tion of VPN tunneling and traffic shaping to protect against
such attack. In another independent work that considers
similar problem (i. e. attack based on network traffic even
when the information are encrypted), Liu et al. [22] proposed
a privacy-preserving traffic obfuscation framework based
on differential privacy to thwart traffic analysis attack. Their
framework protect against information sent/received from
home gateways in a smart community environment. We
remark that our scheme protect data privacy and authentic-
ity directly through cryptographic mechanism, and can be
combined with the schemes proposed by Choi et al. [19] and
Apthorpe et al. and Liu et al. to arrive at a comprehensive
privacy-preserving smart home solution that also protect
against side-channel attack.
2.2 Queries on Encrypted Data
Song, Wagner and Perrig [23] introduced a practical and ef-
ficient searchable encryption scheme using only symmetric
primitives. However their scheme requires sequential scan
on every encrypted word in a file in order to search for
the keyword matching a query. Goh [24] then proposed a
secure index-based approach that does not require scanning
of every words in a file, but the work effort is still linear to
the total number of files for each query irregardless to the
number of files matching the query, which can be of small
size. Following from these, Curtmola et al. [25] proposed
a comprehensive formal security model, together with two
index-based schemes provably secure under this model.
Chase and Kamara [26] then generalised the model for SE
scheme that works on arbitrarily-structured data including
social network and graph data. Since then, many variants
were proposed by adapting the index structure presented by
Curtmola et al. and Cash and Kamara or inventing new ones.
There are schemes that provide richer functionalities, such
as Boolean search [27], dynamic Boolean search [28], ranked
search [29], [30] as well as semantic-aware scheme [31].
There are also schemes providing better security with less
leakage and forward privacy [32], hide access pattern using
private information retrieval in a two-server setting for
large-scale database [33], as well as efficient blind storage
where the server acts only as a commodity server offering
only upload and download services [34]. Most of the search-
able encryption schemes achieve practicality by allowing
leakage of certain information such as access patterns. Anal-
ysis of leakage on searchable encryption schemes was first
studied by Islam et al. [35]. Cash et al. [36] then proposed
a framework that define the security level of a scheme
based on the information being leaked, and an improved
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analysis. Various analysis have since been presented fol-
lowing these two seminal works that analyse searchable
encryption schemes. They include analysis based on active
attack [37], passive attacks [38], and analysis on scheme with
specific functionality such as range queries based on order-
preserving or order-revealing techniques [39], [40].More
recently, given both the existing scheme and attack cases,
practical schemes with better functionalities, performance
and security properties have been proposed. These includes
the Boolean search scheme [41], the scheme with improved
locality [42] and a leakage suppression scheme [43]. Com-
prehensive surveys on searchable encryption can be found
in [44], [45], [46].
In terms of encrypted queries for smart systems, Wen
et al. [47], [48] proposed novel and effective mechanisms in
providing queries on encrypted data for smart grid system,
which is related to our work in the smart home envi-
ronments. Our underlying motivation is similar to theirs,
whereby data privacy must be protected when the various
measurements are queried and retrieved from the smart grid
(e.g. smart meters) to prevent an attacker from learning the
behaviours and activities of a household. The proposals for
smart grid deploy public-key based cryptographic primi-
tives (e.g. pairings), which is compute intensive compared
to schemes utilizing only symmetric primitives. Their con-
sideration, however, is slightly different from ours, in that
range queries must be provided for financial auditing. In
our case, we consider queries that require equality match.
For instance, an encrypted query on an appliance and one of
its functionality (e.g. temperature) would return the current
value in encrypted form. Hence, we use symmetric-based
searchable encryption instead. In our searchable encryp-
tion protocol, we adopt and tweak the index-structure of
the recent existing searchable encryption scheme, in which
details of the scheme is described in Figure 2. We also
develop our model based on the well-established formal
security model of searchable encryption. These allow us to
design a practical scheme suitable for use with smart devices
(sometimes with constrained computation and storage ca-
pabilities), while providing security assurance through the
security model.
3 DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTION
In this section, we define the main entities involved in our
scheme, and the security goals that we aim to achieve.
3.1 Entities
Our scheme involves four main entities. These are:
• A user, User i, who installs and uses a smart home system.
We assume the user to be fully trusted. The user also has
a mobile device MDi that has a software installed for the
control of the smart home system. We also assume the
mobile device and software are fully trusted.
• A service provider, SP , which provides the smart home sys-
tem. We assume the service provider to be semi-trusted,
in contrast to many existing studies, such as the proposals
presented in Section 2.1. Our main focus in this work is
such that the storage of data collected from the smart
devices, and queries of these information are secure and
privacy-preserved. In other words, the service provider
does not learn any information from the stored data and
the queries by the user.
• A home gateway, which manages, and communicates data
to/from the sensors and smart devices. Here, the gateway
represents a home router. In contrast to most of the
work discussing security in smart homes (as presented
in Section 2.1) where the gateway is fully trusted, here
we present our work considering the case where the gate-
way is semi-trusted. This is to simulate the environment
where the gateway is corrupted and an adversary is able
to persistently listens and captures the communications
between the gateway and the other entities. We further
note we assume the secret key of the gateway is stored
securely.
• Many smart devices, which execute command and collect
information as per the functionality of the devices (e.g.
HVAC, lights, temperature). These devices are trusted in
a way that we assume physically compromising these
devices is infeasible so that the underlying secret keys for
entity authentication and searchable encryption remain
protected.
All of which communicate among one another through an
open communication network (i.e. home wireless network
and the Internet).
3.2 Security Goals
There are four main goals that we aim to address through
our scheme, based on our discussions on the security and
privacy issues in smart homes in Section 1.2:
• Data confidentiality. An adversary should not be able to
learn any information from the communicated or stored
data.
• Privacy-preserving queries on encrypted data. An adversary
should not be able to learn the queries, or learn the
underlying data based on these queries except for the
access and query patterns.
• Data authentication. Authenticity of the transmitted data
is verifiable. In other words, the entities involved in the
scheme (e.g. the user, the gateway, or the service provider)
is able to detect modification made by an adversary (an
outsider).
• Entity authentication. Identities of the parties involved are
verifiable and an adversary success probability of mas-
querading an authorized parties should be negligible.
Our security goals follow the main security objectives for
smart homes (except privacy-preserving queries that we
define), as discussed by Komninos et al. [13]. Here we
assume the network is always available, and authoriza-
tion is such that once the user successfully authenticated
himself/herself, he/she has access to all the information
available in a smart device, which is common in a smart
home setting.
4 PRIVHOME: OVERVIEW & PROTOCOLS
4.1 Overview
We now consider an application model for intelligent home
network service. The model is composed of a set of mobile
users, home gateways, a set of smart home devices, and
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a service provider that is implanted into the TD-SCDMA
network. Our goal is to allow a user with a mobile device
to access his home network and communicate with spe-
cific home devices via the existing TD-SCDMA network.
And the general process is carried out as follows. The
user with the mobile device communicates with its nearby
base station and requests home network service from the
service provider. After receiving the user’s request, the
service provider contacts the corresponding home gateway
through the dedicated secure line (such as X2 interface in 5G
HetNet [49]) and sends data request to the home gateway.
Then, the home gateway reads the real-time information of
the home devices through the one-hop Wireless (802.11) and
sends back the information to the service provider. Next,
the service provider transmits the information to the home
user. Now in order to achieve the security goals stated in
Section 3.2 in this application model (depicted in Figure 1)
here we introduce two protocols which are the core of our
scheme. An authenticated key-establishment protocol nego-
tiates a session key between the entities, that is later used to
initiate an instance of a searchable encryption protocol, all
of which use only symmetric techniques in order to achieve
practical performance. Our scheme can be bootstrapped by
each smart device, the gateway and the user sharing a secret
key, for example, through an out-of-band channel. This can
be performed during the installation of the smart devices,
where a key is set by the user.
Our authenticated key-establishment protocol utilizes
the secret key to provide mutual authentication between the
involved entities and agree on a session key for secure com-
munication and queries of encrypted data. Our searchable
encryption protocol, on the other hand, derives an index
masking key from the secret key, to construct a searchable
inverted index for the smart devices. The index is stored
on each of the devices. During queries, the authenticated
entities search the masked index using an encrypted queries
that is communicated through the secure session.
While one may adopt existing authenticated key-
establishment protocol and searchable encryption protocol,
we note that the construction and combination of the two
protocols are not as straightforward as it seems. Firstly,
there is additional computation due to the introduction of
private query to preserve data privacy using searchable
encryption. We address this issue by designing our search-
able encryption protocol based on the efficient inverted
index approach. In this approach, we only use symmetric
encryption scheme and pseudo-random function. Our index
construction bares similar structure and property as in the
practical scheme proposed by Cash et al. [28], which has
been shown to be very efficient even for large database. For
instance, their most efficient scheme requires slightly more
than 100ms to return 10, 000 query results for a database
with 108 items using blades with Dual Intel Xeon 2.4GHz
E5620 processors. In our case our datasets would be much
smaller considering the functionalities of the devices in a
smart home. Secondly, there is the difficulty in the fact that
authentication and key-establishment must be performed
between at least three entities (i.e. the user, the gateway and
the smart device) instead of the commonly assumed two-
party case. Added to that, such operations must also ensure
confidentiality and integrity of the underlying queries. For
this, we integrate our authenticated key-establishment pro-
tocol and the searchable encryption protocol in such a way
that both the security properties are preserved. We achieved
this by integrating the query operations and query results
in the authenticated session established through the key-
establishment protocol. Thirdly, in the case of searchable
encryption, the data structure in smart home is slightly dif-
ferent from the common keyword-file (or record) pair as in
most schemes. Instead of directly querying a keyword, the
query must first identify the specific device to be queried,
and then query the functionality and retrieve the data of
that functionality of the device. This means we cannot ap-
ply directly existing searchable encryption scheme. Further-
more, data in a smart home device is updated frequently,
as opposed to the static database and occasional updates
considered by most schemes. We address these issues by
constructing a new searchable encryption scheme, in which
the underlying masked index structure uses randomized
device identifier as key that links to the encrypted values of
the device’s many functionalities, all using only symmetric
key techniques. This also means update on the values is
efficient, that involves only matching the device’s identifier
and replacing the existing stored encrypted value with the
new encrypted value. In the followings we present the
detailed design of the two protocols.
4.2 A Lightweight Authenticated Key-Establishment
Protocol
Our authenticated key-establishment (AKE) protocol in-
volves a user (Useri ), who has a mobile device MDi with
Internet connectivity, requests through the home gateway
to know the status of a particular smart device (e.g. a home
appliance). In this context, the home gateway will assist both
the smart device and the user to establish a session key.
We assume the home gateway and the smart device share a
secret key kgd. The pre-sharing of key can be performed
through an out-of-band channel (e.g. by the user during
setting up the device) or in a similar way as described in [6],
[16]. The secret key is used to assist three-party authentica-
tion process between the user, the gateway and the smart
device. We also assume the service provider and the home
gateway share a secret key kgs, for mutual authentication
between the service provider and the home gateway for
data collections and storage at the service provider. The
service provider may generates the key a priori and embed
the secret key securely in the gateway before delivering the
system to the user. Our proposed scheme consists of the
following two phases: setup phase and authentication phase.
4.2.1 Setup (Setup) Phase
The user Useri register a smart device SDq based on the
following steps.
Step S1: Useri registers his/her identity IDi to the smart
device SDq through a secure (out-of-band) channel.
Step S2: After receiving the registration request, the
smart device SDq randomly generates a unique shadow
identity SIDq , a secret key ki , and also generates a set
of pseudo identities PID ={pid1 ,pid2 ,...,pidn}, which are
later used in case of loss of synchronization between the
device and the Useri . Next, SDq composes a message with
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{SIDq , ki , PID} and sends to the Useri through the said
secure channel. Finally, SDq stores {SIDq , ki , PID} in its
storage for further interaction with the Useri . Here SIDq ,
ki , PID can be represented as binary strings, and randomly
generated using a pseudo-random function with security
parameter λ.
Step S3: Upon receiving {SIDq , ki , PID} from SDq , the
user gives his/her thumb impression βi and password pswi
and computes αi=h(βi), ∂i=h(αi ||pswi ), k
∗
i =ki⊕h(βi||pswi ).
Here h is a hash function and we assume the thumb im-
pression βi is unique for each user, and is identical every
time a user provides it. A fuzzy extractor may be used,
if we assume there is slight differences in βi every time
it is captured. Finally, the user Useri stores {∂i, SIDq , k
∗
i ,
PID} into his/her mobile device for communication with
the smart device SDq at a later stage.
4.2.2 Authentication (Auth) Phase
To achieve communication security, a userUseri needs to go
through an authentication and the key-establishment pro-
cess each time before obtaining services from the gateway.
The proposed scheme consists of the following steps:
Step A1: Useri inserts his/her thumb impression βi and
password pswi into his/her mobile device MDi and then
the user’s mobile device calculates αi=h(βi), ∂
′
i =h(αi ||pswi )
and checks whether ∂
′
i
?
= ∂i. If the validation is unsuccessful,
MDi will abort the authentication process. Otherwise, MDi
calculates ki=k
∗
i ⊕ h(βi||pswi ). After that, the user generates
a nonceNi and subsequently, finds his/her location through
GPS and gets the location area identity LAIi based on
the latitude and longitude of the location, where he/she
is positioning. Hereafter, he/she computes EL = LAIi
⊕
h(ki ||Ni ), a key-hash response V1=h(SIDq ||Ni ||ki ||EL) and
subsequently composes a message MA1 :{SIDq , Ni , EL,V1}
and sends to the gateway via service provider.
Remark: Here, the reason behind using location identi-
fiers (LAIs) is that, initially the user can select the possible
locations with location identifiers (LAIs) [50], from where
he/she may request for services and then sends the list
of possible locations to the home gateway. Now, during
the execution of the authentication phase if the gateway
finds LAIi produced by the user is not in the list, then
the gateway will ask the service provider to alert the user
and also ask him/her to confirm the location. Besides, in
our proposed scheme, because of the usage of the ran-
dom number Ni in LAIi an adversary will not be able to
distinguish the multiple requests of the same user from a
particular location. In this way, we retain the untraceability
property. Now, in order to prevent an adversary from de-
livering incorrect information about the current position of
the home user, the message sources must be verified. In our
proposed scheme, the GPS server which helps the user to
locate himself/herself, is assumed to be trusted. Therefore,
using a shared secret key between the GPS server and the
user, here we can ensure message source authentication.
There are existing literatures [51], however these solutions
utilized RSA-based sign-encryption technique, which could
be infeasible for the resource constrained mobile devices.
Step A2: Upon receiving the message MA1 , the gate-
way generates a random number Ng and calculates
V2=h(IDg ||Ng ||Kgd ||LAIg ), where LAIg denotes the loca-
tion of the gateway and Kgd represents the share secret key
between the gateway and the device SDq . Next, the gateway
composes a message MA2 :{MA1 , IDg , Ng ,LAIg , V2} and
sends it to the device SDq .
Step A3: After receiving the message MA2 , the device
SDq first locates SIDq in its database and then computes
and validates the key hash responses V1 ,V2 . Next, the
gateway decodes LAIi from EL and then compares and
validate LAIi with the LAIg . If the validation is successful,
SDq generates a session key SK, and a new shadow identity
SIDnewq and then computes SID
new∗
q =SID
new
q
⊕
h(SIDq
|| ki ), SKi=h(IDi ||ki ||Ni )
⊕
SK,SKg=h(IDg ||Kgd ||Ng )
⊕
SK,
V3=h(SKg ||Kgd ||Ng ), V4=h(SKi ||ki ||SID
new∗
q ). Next, SDq
composes a message MA3 :{(SID
new∗
q , SKi ,V4 )||(SKg , V3 )}
and sends MA3 to the gateway.
Step A4: Upon receiving the response message MA3
from the device SDq , the gateway first computes and
validates the key-hash response V3 . If the validation
is successful, the gateway decodes the session key
SK=h(IDg ||Kgd ||Ng )
⊕
SKg and composes a new message
MA4 :{(SID
new∗
q , SKi ,V4 )}and then send it to the user
Useri .
Step A5: After receiving the message MA4 , Useri first
verifies the key-hash response V4 . If the validation is
successful, Useri computes and decodes the session key
SK=h(IDi ||ki ||Ni )
⊕
SKi , and the new shadow identity
SIDnewq =SID
new∗
q
⊕
h(SIDq ||ki ) for the next round.
Note that, if any steps of the above validation process
is unsuccessful, then entities involved in this protocol will
abort the execution of the scheme. In case of loss of syn-
chronization, instead of the shadow identity SIDq , the user
Useri needs to select one of the unused pseudo identities
pidx from PID ={pid1 ,pid2 ,...,pidn} and send it in the mes-
sage MA1 . On receiving this message and after successfully
validating the user, the device SDq generates a new shadow
identity and securely sends it in the message MA3 by using
the secret key ki . During the authentication process, both
the Useri and the device deletes the used pseudo identity
pidx from their storage.
Lastly, we present the authentication and key-
establishment process between the service provider SP and
the gateway. This is to facilitate data submission to the
storage of the service provider. A smart home system, for
example, may potentially store voice data in the storage
of the service provider. This is to facilitate data processing
(e. g. voice commands) and return the results to the smart
device. In this instance, the queries and the data should be
protected from being listen to or modify by an outsider.
Furthermore, in the interest of user privacy, the data and the
queries should not be learnt by the service provider. In the
following we demonstrate how this can be done. We state
the authentication protocol operated between the device, the
gateway and the service provider based on standard one
pass mechanism.
Step A*1: The smart device SDq generates a sequence
numberNq , and computes V
∗
1 = Enc(kgd, Nq, IDg, (τq, eq)),
where kgd is a secret key shared between SDq and the
gateway, IDg the unique identifier of the gateway and
(τq, eq) the tuple of the encrypted searchable index and the
list of encrypted attribute values (which will be discussed
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in the section on our searchable encryption protocol). The
smart device SDq then sendsMA∗
1
: {V ∗1 } to the gateway.
Step A*2: Upon receiving MA∗
1
: {V ∗1 }, the gateway
decrypts V ∗1 using the shared key kgd. If the decryption
is successful, the gateway generates a sequence number
Ng′ and computes V
∗
2 = Enc(kgs, Ng′ , IDsp, (τq, eq)), where
kgs is a secret key shared between the gateway and the
service provider SP , and IDsp the unique identifier of SP .
The gateway then sends V ∗2 to the service provider SP .
The service provider SP decrypts V ∗2 using kgs and stores
(τq, eq). We remark that in our protocol (Figure 3), we do not
depict the encrypted queries from the gateway to the service
provider, but only show encrypted queries by the user
through the gateway to the smart devices. This is because
many smart appliances (e.g. lighting, HVAC, surveillance
camera) can be controlled directly between the user mobile
device and the gateway. However, we note that the protocol
can be adapted to perform encrypted queries through the
service provider instead, by a two steps process where the
user query through the authenticated gateway, and then
the gateway send the query to the authenticated service
provider [52].
4.3 An Efficient Searchable Encryption Protocol
In this section we describe our searchable encryption (SSE)
protocol. We utilize a symmetric encryption scheme E
and a pseudorandom function H , which we define in the
followings. A randomized symmetric encryption scheme
E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) consists of three PPT algorithms.
Gen takes λ and outputs a secret key K ; Enc takes
K and a message d ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a cipher-
text c; For all K from Gen and d ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have
Dec(K, Enc(K, d)) = d with probability 1. We say E is
IND-CPA if for all PPT adversary A, Advind−cpaE,A (λ) =
|Pr[AK←Gen(1
λ),c←Enc(K,d) = 1] − Pr[Ac
R
←−{0,1}∗ = 1]| is
negligible. A function H : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
from H the set of all functions {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is
pseudo-random if for all PPT adversary A, AdvprfH,A(λ)
= |Pr[AH(K,.),K
R
←−{0,1}λ = 1] − Pr[Ag(.),g
R
←−H = 1]| is
negligible. Detailed treatments of these primitives can be
found in [53].
Our protocol involves a user Useri submitting a query
to a smart device via the home gateway. Let λ ∈ N be
the security parameter and || as concatenation. The user
owns a set of smart devices, SD = {SD1,SD2, . . . ,SDn},
and each device SDq maintains a list of functionalities
(e.g. on/off, high/low, values) Fq = (fq,1, fq,2, . . . , fq,h)
for 1 ≤ q ≤ n, and each functionality contains value
represented as a string, dq,j ∈ {0, 1}
φ(λ) where φ is a
polynomial function in λ. Here we denote the list of values
as dq = (dq,1, dq,2, . . . , dq,h). In our work, we assume every
device has equal number of functionalities. In practice this
may not be the case, but in order to hide the possibility of a
service provider being able to guess the underlying device
based on just the differences in the number of functionality,
we can pad each device with dummy values. Similarly,
the value stored in each functionality is padded to the
same length. This means all the encrypted values across
different devices will have the same size, thus preserving
the privacy of the data and the device from adversary with
background knowledge from learning the types of devices
via the differences in size of the encrypted values.
For each device SDq , we say there is an index table of
the form Iq = IDq||Fq , where IDq is the unique identifier
of the device. Given a pair of value (IDq, fq,j), Iq returns
the value dq,j . We also define {1, 2, . . . , n} as [n], x ← A
to mean x is an output of an algorithm A and x
R
←− X to
mean random selection of a value x from a set X . We use
negl(x) to denote a negligible function. Now we define our
searchable encryption protocol.
Definition 1. We define a searchable encryption protocol SSE as
consisting of the following phases:
• K ← KeyGen(1λ). It outputs a secret key k and a data
encryption key ke. Set K = {k, ke}.
• (τq, eq)← Update(K, Iq,dq). Given as inputs the secret key
K , the index Iq and the list of values dq of the functionality in
Iq , the protocol returns a masked (or encrypted) Iq as τq and
the list of encrypted value eq = (eq,1, eq,2, . . . , eq,h).
• (ρq, µq,j) ← GenToken(K, IDq, fq,j). Given as inputs the
secret keyK , the device identifier IDq , the functionality fq,j , it
outputs an encrypted tuple (ρq, µq,j), where ρq is the masked
(or encrypted) value of IDq , and µq,j the masked (or encrypted)
value of fq,j .
• eq,j ← Query(ρq, µq,j , τq, eq). Given as inputs the masked
tuple (ρq, µq,j), the masked index τq and the encrypted list of
values eq , it returns the matched encrypted value eq,j .
The SSE protocol is said to be correct if Query returns the correct
encrypted value that matches the functionality of the device that
is being searched for. Under the real-ideal paradigm and a leakage
profile LSSE = (L
update
SSE
,Lquery
SSE
), the SSE protocol is LSSE-
secure against chosen query attacks if for all PPT adversary A,
there exists a PPT simulator S such that AdvSSE,A,S(λ) =
|Pr[RealSSE,A(λ) = 1]−Pr[IdealSSE,A,S(λ) = 1| ≤ negl(λ)
where the game is as follows:
RealSSE,A(λ). Given Iq , for 1 ≤ q ≤ n, the challenger
executes Update, where the resulting (τq, eq) are given to
A. A then makes a polynomial number of adaptive queries to
the Query protocol. For each query the challenger returns the
query result to A. Finally A returns a bit b as the output of the
experiment.
IdealSSE,A,S(λ). The simulator S simulates (τq, eq) based on
the leakage information from Lupdate
SSE
, and gives (τq, eq) to A,
who then makes a polynomial number of adaptive queries. The
simulator S returns the query result for every query based on
Lquery
SSE
to A. Finally A returns a bit b as the output of the
experiment.
Now we present a concrete construction, which is
specified in Figure 2. We note that if there is an identical
functionality in different smart devices, in order to hide
such information, the user can keep a list and compute
the masked functionality by H(kDq,2, fq,j , 1) for the first
occurrence, H(kDq,2, fq,j , 2) for the second and so on.
Proposition 1. We say that our protocol SSE is LSSE-
secure if the underlying symmetric encryption scheme E
and the pseudorandom function H are secure.
Proof. We state security of the protocol based on the
construction of a simulator S in such a way that an
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K ← KeyGen(1λ):
1) Randomly generate a secret key k and a data encryption
key ke.
2) Set K = (k, ke).
(τq, eq)← Update(K, Iq,dq)
1) Generate kDq = H(k, IDq).
2) Generate kDq ,1 = H(kDq ||1) and kDq ,2 = H(kDq ||2).
3) Extract IDq from Iq . Compute a masked identifier,
hIDq = H(kDq ,1, IDq).
4) ExtractFq from Iq . For every functionality fq,j , compute
a masked functionality as hfq,j = H(kDq ,2, fq,j). (Here
we assume every functionality is unique).
5) Encrypt every value of the functionality as eq,j =
Enc(ke, dq,j , rq,j), where rq,j is a pseudo-random
nonce. (Every update of the value a different pseudo-
random nonce is used to mask identical value).
6) Set τq = hIDq ||(hfq,1 , . . . , hfq,n).
7) Set eq = (eq,1, . . . , eq,n)
(ρq, µq,j)← GenToken(kDq , IDq, fq,j):
1) Generate kDq ,1 = H(kDq ||1) and kDq ,2 = H(kDq ||2).
2) Compute ρq = hIDq = H(kDq ,1, IDq).
3) Compute µq,j = hfq,j = H(kDq ,2, fq,j).
eq,j ← Query(ρq, µq,j , τq, eq):
1) If ρq = hIDq in τq , retrieve (hfq,1 , . . . , hfq,n).
2) If µq,j = hfq,j , retrieve eq,j .
3) return eq,j .
Fig. 2. SSE: An Efficient Searchable Encryption Protocol
adversary A is not able to distinguish between the real
execution of the protocol or a simulated one. We first define
the leakage profile of our protocol.
Lupdate
SSE
= (n,Fq): For the update operation, the number
of smart devices n, and the number of functionalities Fq
of each device SDq is known to an adversary. Recall that
we assume each smart device has equal number of func-
tionalities to avoid an adversary from learning the type of
smart device based only on the differences of the number
of functionalities in each device. Since the masked identifier
hidq in the real execution is a pseudorandom string, S is able
to simulate an identifier by selecting a random string of the
same size. Similarly, every masked functionality is also a
pseudorandom string, hence simulation can be performed
in a same way. What is left to be simulated is the encrypted
values of the functionalities. Since every encrypted value
is also a pseudorandom string, S simulates the value by
selecting a random of the same size. It follows that an
ideal execution of the update operation is distinguishable
with only negligible probability, since S is able to simulate
the masked identifier, the masked functionality and the
underlying encrypted values.
Lquery
SSE
= ((ρq, µq,j), eq,j): In the case of query, the
protocol reveals the query tuple (ρq, µq,j) containing the
masked identifier and the masked functionality as well
as the access patterns (the returned encrypted value). In
order to simulate the result of the query, the simulator S
first creates a list that stores the matching query and the
returned value. This allows S to simulate query that has
been performed previously. When a query is made, S checks
whether the query has been made previously. If this is the
case, S retrieves and returns the matching query from the
list to the user. If not, S randomly selects an encrypted value
from one of the masked index and returns the value. The
query and the output of this new query is then added to the
list. 
We note that in the above statement the adversary learns
the leakage profile only if it has access to the final stored
masked and encrypted index as well as the encrypted query.
Since in our scheme, the update and query operations are
secured under an authenticated key exchange protocol that
we proposed, an outsider will not be able to even learn the
leakage information. This is also the case if the provider
does not store the masked indexes and encrypted values.
Furthermore, the indexes and the values stored in the en-
crypted form in the smart devices prevent an adversary
that managed to access these information from learning the
underlying values except for the leakage profile.
5 PRIVHOME: THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we present our scheme that utilizes the
protocols presented in the previous section. Figure 3 shows
the detailed steps of the scheme, consisting of three phases:
Setup, entity authentication and key establishment, and private
queries on encrypted data. We note that each entity has an
identifier denoted as IDx, where x ∈ {i, g, q, sp}. The
gateway shares a secret key kgd with a smart device, and
shares a secret key kgs with the service provide SP. This
secret keys can be setup using an out-of-band channel, such
as during installation of the gateway and the smart device.
The scheme combines the AKE and SSE protocols to achieve
the security goal and address the issues stated in Section 4
as follows. The scheme executes SSE.KeyGen to first gen-
erate the secret key K = (k, ke) for data encryption and
query, and transport K as part of the message to the user’s
device based on the setup protocol of AKE. The scheme then
establishes a session key SK and an authenticated session
between the user, the gateway and a smart device. The
session key SK is used to establish a secure channel for
transmitting the encrypted queries and receiving the query
results. By doing so we link the queries to the authenticated
session so that the device is assured that the queries are
from an authorized user. Furthermore, even in the event that
the session is compromised, the adversary will only have
access to the encrypted token and encrypted data. Without
the encryption keys, the adversary learns nothing about
the query and the underlying data except for the leakage
due to the searchable encryption scheme, as formalized in
Section 4.3.
5.1 Setup
In this phase, an instance of the authenticated key-
establishment protocol AKE, as well as the searchable en-
cryption protocol SSE is instantiated by the scheme.
SSE: The smart device SDq with identifier IDq executes
the scheme by first calling SSE.KeyGen, to generate a secret
key ki for User i and a data encryption key ke that is used
to encrypt the underlying data and measurements of the de-
vices. Both keys are stored securely in SDq’s secure storage.
The smart device SDq then runs SSE.Update to create a
masked index τq for the device q. For every time interval
where device SDq updates its data, it runs SSE.Update to
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Setup
Entity Authentication & Key Establishment
Private Queries of Encrypted Data
User i
MD i
SP Gateway
ID i ID i
Generate:
SIDq
PID = fpid1 ; pid2 ; : : : ; pidng
K = (ki, ke)
MS1 : fIDq;SIDq ;K ;PIDg
Compute:
βi; pswi
αi = h(βi)
@i = h(αi jjpswi)
k∗i = ki ⊕ h(βijjpswi)
Compute:
For each device q:
βi; pswi
αi = h(βi)
@0i = h(αi jjpswi)
Check: @i
?
= @0i
Generate: Ni
Compute:
ki = k
∗
i ⊕ h(βijjpswi)
EL = LAIi ⊕ h(ki jjNi)
V1=h(SIDq jjNi jjki jjEL)
MA1 :fSIDq , Ni , EL;V1g
Generate: Ng
V2=h(IDg jjNg jjKgd jjLAIg)
Compute:
MA2 :fMA1 , IDg , Ng ,LAIg , V2g
Verify: SIDq ; V1; V2
Compare: LAI i with LAI g
Generate: SK ;SIDnewq
Compute:
SIDnew∗q =SID
new
q ⊕h(SIDq jjki)
SKi=h(IDi jjki jjNi)⊕SK
SKg=h(IDg jjKgd jjNg)⊕SK
V3=h(SKg jjKgd jjNg)
V4=h(SKi jjki jjSID
new∗
q )
MA3 :f(SID
new∗
q , SKi ,V4 )jj(SKg , V3 )g
Compute & Verify: V3
Decode: SK=h(IDg jjKgd jjNg)⊕SKg
MA4 :f(SID
new∗
q , SKi ,V4 )g
Compute & Verify: V4
Decode: SK=h(IDi jjki jjNi)⊕SKi
SIDnewq =SID
new∗
q ⊕h(SIDq jjki)
Generate:
kDq = H(ki; IDq)
(ρq;µq;j)  GenToken(kDq ; IDq; fq;j)
MQ1 :fEnc(SK; ρq;µq;j), V5g
V5 = h(SKjjρqjjµq;j jjEnc(SK; ρq;µq;j))
Compute & Verify: V5
(τq; eq)  Update(K; Iq;dq)
Decrypt: Enc(SK; ρq;µq;j)
MQ1 :fEnc(SK; ρq;µq;j), V5g
Compute:
eq;j  Query(ρq;µq;j ; τq; eq)
MQ2 :fEnc(SK; eq;j), V6g
V6 = h(SKjjeq;j jjEnc(SK; eq;j))
MQ2 :fEnc(SK; eq;j), V6g
Compute & Verify: V6
Decrypt: Enc(SK; eq;j)
Decrypt: eq;j
dq;j
AKE.Setup: S1
AKE.Setup: S2
SSE.KeyGen
SSE.Update
AKE.Setup: S3
AKE.Auth: A1
AKE.Auth: A2
AKE.Auth: A3
AKE.Auth: A4
AKE.Auth: A5
SSE.GenToken
SSE.Query
Smart device SDq
(IDg; kgd; kgs) (IDq; kgd)(IDsp; kgs)
Generate: Nq
V ∗1 = Enc(kgd; Nq; IDg; (τq; eq))
Compute:
AKE.Auth: A*1
MA∗
1
:fV ∗1 g
Generate: Ng0
V ∗2 = Enc(kgs; Ng0 ; IDsp; (τq; eq))
Compute:
Decrypt: V ∗1
MA∗
2
:fV ∗2 g
Decrypt: V ∗2
ID i
MA1 :fSIDq , Ni , EL;V1g
MA4 :f(SID
new∗
q , SKi ,V4 )g
MQ1 :fEnc(SK; ρq;µq;j), V5g
MQ2 :fEnc(SK; eq;j), V6g
Fig. 3. PrivHome: An Authenticated, Privacy-Preserving Data Query Protocol
encrypts the data and updates the index in τq . The masked
index τq and the encrypted data eq are stored in the device.
These information, (τq , eq), can be stored at a smart hub
instead as we remarked in Section 4 if a device lacks storage
resources, and can be backup to the service provider from
time to time if required. In such a scenario encrypted queries
can be performed through the smart hub.
AKE: Useri and the device SDq jointly execute
AKE.Setup in order for Useri to register as a user with
an identity IDi . As a result, Useri stores the thumb print
and password information ∂i securely in the mobile de-
vice secure storage, as well as storing the secret key ki
protected by his/her password and thumb print k∗i , and
the pseudo-identity information of the device SIDq , and
PID into his/her mobile device. The gateway stores Useri ’s
information {SIDq , ki , and PID} in its storage.
5.2 Entity Authentication and Key Establishment
In this phase, the scheme executes the authenticated key-
establishment protocol in order to authenticate the user, the
gateway and the device SDq , as well as establish a session
key between the user and SDq .
AKE: Useri and the gateway jointly execute AKE.Auth
facilitated by SP in order for Useri and SDq to establish
and agree on a session key SK . It follows the four steps
as described in Section 4.2.2. Useri and SDq uses SK to
encrypt the data and queries communicated between them.
A symmetric encryption scheme Enc, as was defined and
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used in our searchable encryption protocol (Section 4.3), can
be deployed for encryption using SK .
5.3 Private Queries on Encrypted Data
After the user entity has been authenticated, with the ex-
traction and usage of ki, and a session key SK established
between Useri and SDq , the scheme executes SSE.Query
to query for information from a smart device through the
communication channel betweenUseri , SP and the gateway.
The scheme may also execute SSE.Update to refresh the
values in SDq , whenever new data is collected from SDq .
SSE: Useri first prepares a query (which may contain
a command on a certain functionality, for example, to
increase/decrease temperature of a HVAC unit, or switch
on/off of lights, as well as queries for information such as
video from a surveillance camera or health status from a
body sensor). Useri then generates the device, SDq’s secret
key using ki, resulting in kDq = H(ki, IDq). The query
is then masked by executing SSE.GenToken, given the
query containing the device ID, functionality and kDq as
input. The resulting token is sent over to SDq through the
gateway, through the authenticated session protected by the
session key SK . The device SDq then executes SSE.Query
using the token as input and the encrypted index, and
returns the encrypted functionality value to the Useri , also
through the authenticated session.
5.4 Security Analysis
PrivHome achieves the security goal as presented in Sec-
tion 3.2. In the followings we provide discussions on how
PrivHome achieve these goals.
• Data confidentiality. All data-in-transit for a session be-
tween Useri and the smart device SDq is encrypted using
an established session key SK . This provides end-to-end
encryption whereby any outsider listening to the traffics
will only be able to capture the encrypted data. As long
as a well-established and secure symmetric encryption
scheme (i. e. AES) is used, it is infeasible for an adver-
sary to learn any information from the encrypted data.
Similarly, the data-at-rest in the smart device SDq , or
gateway, or the service provider SP , are encrypted using
the symmetric encryption scheme provided through the
searchable encryption scheme. This means, as in the above
case, an outsider will not be able to learn the content.
• Privacy-preserving queries of encrypted data. When Useri
submits an encrypted query, it is communicated through
the encrypted channel based on the session key SK.
Hence an adversary will not be able to know the query.
In the event where an adversary get hold of the masked
index, the adversary will not be able to learn the content of
the index as well, since the values are encrypted. A semi-
trusted service provider, who might in its possession the
masked index and the encrypted data, may try to learn
the content of these two datasets. Similarly, the gateway
has access to the session key (Step A4 in Section 4.2.2) and
thus it has in its possession the encrypted queries and the
encrypted query results. The gateway may try to learn the
underlying content of these encrypted messages. Except
for the leakage defined in Section 4.3, since the index, the
query and the data are encrypted under the key that is
only available to the user, data confidentiality is protected
and the scheme is secure up to the security of the leakage
profile. We note that leakage during query has since been
studied and inference attacks have been devised, in the
environment of single keyword search on plaintext and
databases [36], [37]. The study on how the leakage profile
affects the security of a searchable encryption scheme is
an on-going and active research area. We will explore, in
our future work, the potential of an adversary being able
to infer the plaintext from the indexes and the encrypted
values in the smart devices’ data structure.
• Data authentication. In order to prevent modification to
the data by malicious adversary, the data communicated
between the user Useri and the device SDq are authen-
ticated based on a keyed hash function with the session
key SK as input. This means if an adversary modifies the
data, the user and the device will be able to detect such
modification based on the verification of the hash value.
• Entity authentication. The Useri , through the mobile de-
vice, is authenticated through a multi-factor mechanism.
This includes biometric and location. Once the session key
is established, an authenticated session between the user
Useri and the device SDq is maintained. Hence without
the combination of the human factor and the mobile
device, it is infeasible for an adversary to impersonate the
identity of the user. As for SDq , as long as the device
is not physically tampered with or its software being
modified during software upgrade, the secret key of the
device serves as an identity authentication mechanism.
The above mentioned limitations can be circumvented
using, for example, giving the device access to a physically
unclonable function (PuF). In our proposed lightweight
authentication scheme the user’s device authenticates the
gateway by using the key-hash responseV4 . Similarly, the
gateway authenticates the user (User’s device) by using
the key-hash response V1 . On the other hand, both the
smart home device and the gateway authenticates with
each other’s by using the key-hash response V2 , V3 ,
respectively. Now, during the execution of the data query
protocol, the smart home device authenticates the user
and validates his/her query by using the parameter V5
and similarly the user authenticates the smart device by
using the key-hash response V6 .
5.5 Performance Analysis and Comparison
In this section, we analyse the performance of our proposed
scheme with respect to existing schemes for smart home
environment. Table 1 shows the comparisons of features and
performance between our scheme and the related schemes.
From Table 1, we observe that the schemes presented in [6],
[14], [15], [16] cannot ensure all the desired security proper-
ties. For instance, the schemes presented in [6], [14], [15] can
only ensure data-privacy in transit. Besides, these schemes
does not provide the ”Privacy Query” features. Even though
the scheme presented in [16] can support data privacy under
”Data-at-Rest” and ”Privacy Query”, the scheme cannot
ensure user authentication feature. On the contrary, the
proposed scheme provides better security properties (as
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TABLE 1
Features and Performance Comparisons
Schemes Computation Costs Computation Costs User Data Data Private
(Auth.) (Enc. Query) Authentication Privacy (T) Privacy (R) Query
Kumar et al. [6] 4h + 2mac + 2e – X X × ×
Kumar et al. [15] 2h + 3xor + 2e – X X × ×
Wazid et al. [16] 22h + 2mac + 4e – X X × ×
Wen et al. [48] – ((10N + 12)l + 14)exp + 10pair × X X X
PrivHome 6h + 6xor 2h + (n + 2)mac + (Nl + 2)e X X X X
Notation: h: cryptographic hash operation (e.g. SHA256); mac: cryptographic message authentication code operation (e.g. HMAC-SHA256); e: symmetric encryption
operation (e.g. AES); xor: exclusive-or; In the setting of Wen et al.’s scheme [48], N: domain of attribute values, l: number of data dimensions; n: number of smart
devices; exp: modular exponentiation; pair: Bilinear pairing, where one pairing roughly equal to 8 modular exponentiations [54]. T: Data-in-Transit; R: Data-at-Rest.
TABLE 2
Experimental Specifications
Specification User’s Mobile Device (MD) Smart Home Device (SD) SP/Gateway (GW)
Hardware Specification HTC One X Temperature sensor - TMP36 Intel Core i5-2500 processor
Computation Cost of the Cryptographic Operations Used in [6], [15], [16], [48] and PrivHome
Computational Specification MD SD SP/GW
h (SHA-256) 0.067 ms 1.42 ms 0.037 ms
mac (HMAC-SHA-256) 1.83 ms 3.69 ms 0.078 ms
e (AES-CBC-256 Encryption) 0.072 ms 1.89 ms 0.047 ms
e (AES-CBC-256 Decryption) 0.098 ms 2.47 ms 0.062 ms
exp (Modular Exponentiation Operation) 13.56 ms 21.82 ms 8.77 ms
pair (Pairing Operation) 17.37 ms 27.54 ms 11.23 ms
Communication Cost
Communication Specification MD-SP/GW SP/GW-SD
Link Type TD-SCDMA Network One-hop Wireless (802.11))
Average Transmission Time for 896-bits 23.87 ms 14.32 ms
shown in Table 1), which are desirable for the secure and
privacy-aware communication in smart-home environment.
We further compare our proposed scheme by consider-
ing the computation cost. Again from Table 1, we can see
that the scheme presented in [48], which provides encrypted
query, are based on public-key cryptography. Whereas the
proposed scheme and the schemes presented in [6], [14], [15]
are based on the symmetric key crypto-system. Accordingly,
they impose lower computational overhead on the smart
devices, as compared to [48]. Now, we present experimental
results to analyze the performance of the proposed scheme
more comprehensively. Table 2 presents the experiment
specifications, including the hardware, computational, and
communication specifications. For measuring the computa-
tion time of different cryptographic operations used in [6],
[15], [16], [48] and/or PrivHome, we conducted simulations
of their cryptographic operations on a HTC One X with
ARM Cortex-A9 MPCore processor with 890 MHz CPU
speed (operating as a user’s device MD), a modular sensor
board MSB-430 with the T1 MSP430 micro-controller and
the temperature sensor - TMP36 (operating as the smart
home device SD) and an Intel Core i5-2500 processor laptop
with CPU speed 3.3 GHz (operating as the GW/SP). The
simulation uses the JPBC library Pbc-05.14, and the JCE
library to evaluate the execution time of the cryptographic
operations used in the proposed scheme and [6], [14], [15],
[16]. Now, based on the above simulation outcomes we
can observe that in [6], the computation cost during au-
thentication is 8.86 ms and the communication cost is ≈
76.38 ms. Therefore, the overall authentication and the key
establishment process in [6] takes ≈ 85.24 ms. Similarly,
we find that the authentication and the key establishment
process in [15], and [16], takes ≈ 38.79 ms, ≈ 109.9 ms,
respectively. Whereas in case of PrivHome, it takes 1.75 ms
of computation cost and 67.74 ms of communication cost.
Hence, the entire authentication and the key establishment
process in PrivHome takes≈ 69.49 ms, which is slighly more
than [15], but it does not support data privacy as well as
private query features. Next, we consider the execution time
for the encryption query. In this context, we find that the
computation cost for each encryption query for the Wen et
al.’s scheme [48] takes 5956.07 ms(consideringN = 5, l = 5).
Whereas for the same purpose our proposed scheme takes
only 100.7 (12.91 ms at MD + 87.78 at SD) ms (considering
n = 5, N = 5, l = 5), which is significantly lower than [48]
and hence well suited even for the resource constrained
devices.
In terms of the SSE update operation to update the
values in the smart device from time to time, the scheme
is efficient in that only symmetric techniques are used.
That is, keyed hash computations (1.42 ms per hashing)
and encryption (1.89 ms per encryption). This would be
practical for hourly or for every minute update of data
in a smart device, though with marginal latency. We note
that updating an existing value can be made even more
efficient. A smart device can pre-compute and securely store
the device’s encryption key and masked functionality. Then
what is left to be computed for every update is only the
generation of a pseudo-random number and a symmetric
encryption operation (Figure 2). This means an update of a
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value takes approximately 1.42 + 1.89 ms, since generating
a pseudo-random number can be performed based on a
hash function. Such a performance can be suitable, though
with marginal latency, for devices that require very frequent
update, such as a temperature sensor that may update its
value every seconds.
6 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORKS
We proposed a privacy-preserving and authenticated
scheme for securing smart home communication and data
storage. The scheme, PrivHome, is built based on two
protocols that we also proposed. The first is a lightweight
authentication and key-establishment protocol that is con-
structed to provide practical entity and data authentication
as well as data confidentiality for communication between
the user and the smart device. The second protocol is
a searchable encryption protocol constructed for privacy-
preserving encrypted queries on smart devices, which as
far as we know, has not been presented before. Encrypted
queries and data storage is becoming a more and more
important tool in personal privacy especially with the ad-
vent of smart home devices that record and store user
behaviour data at home. We have shown the protocol to be
secure based on our discussion, and practical through our
initial experimentations on the various and only symmetric
cryptographic primitives deployed. As an on-going work,
we are adapting the protocol towards preserving privacy of
user data under the smart hub setting.
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